Getting Serious About Legal Ethics by Shaffer, Thomas L.




Getting Serious About Legal Ethics
Thomas L. Shaffer
Notre Dame Law School, thomas.l.shaffer.1@nd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas L. Shaffer, Getting Serious About Legal Ethics, 54 The Bar Examiner, no. 3 August (1985) at 4-11.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1268
j • 
[W Tiie lar 
E11a111in11r 
Volume 54, Number 3, August 1985 





National Conference of Bar Examiners 
An Affil iated O rga nization of American Bar Associa tion 




Robert J. Muldoon, Jr. , Boston, Massachusetts 
Immediate Past Chairman 
Sumner T. Bernstein, Portland, Maine 
Chairman-Elect 
Lee A. Satterfield, Washing ton, DC 
Vice-Chairman 
Douglas D. Roche, Detroit, Michigan 
Secretary 
J. Guy Beatty, Jr., Chattanooga, Tennessee 
Board of Managers 
Marvin Barkin, Tampa, Flo rida 
Wayne Denton, Austin, Texas 
Stuart Duhl, Chicago, Illinois 
Hon . Justin M . Johnson, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
Marygold Shire Melli, Madison, Wisconsin 
Armando Menocal, III, San Francisco, California 
Beverly Tarpley, Abilene, Texas 
Executive Director 
Allan Ashman 
Director of Testing, Research & Development 
Joseph R. Julin 
This publication is available 
in microform from University 
Microfilms International. 
Call toU-free 800-5 21-3044. Or mail inquiry to: 
University Microfilms International. 300 North 
Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor. MI 48106. 
rwTllelar 
E•a•i••r 
Volume 54, Number 3, August 1985 
2 Chairman's Letter 
Robert]. Muldoon , Jr. 
Sumner T Bernstein 
Contents 
4 Getting Serious About Legal Ethics 
Thomas L. Shaffer 
12 Readmission and Reinstatement, a Role for Bar Examiners: A Florida Experience 
Stanley A . Spring 
19 South Carolina's Rule S Works Well 
Bruce Littlejohn 
23 Stephen P. Klein: On Testing 
IV. Essay Grading: Fictions, Facts and Forecasts 
Stephen P. Klein 
30 A National Law Practice: Will Piper Lead the Way? 
Allan Ashman --
34 1985 Joint Program 
Editor: Allan Ashman 
Associate Editor: Ann Fisher 
Publication design: Muriel Underwood 
Cover and interior illustrations: Ralph Creasman 
The Bar Examiner is published four times per year by the National Conference of Bar Examiners as a service to 
courts, academia, bar admission administrators, members of bar examining boards and character committees and 
others with special interest in the bar admissions process. Views and opinions in articles are not to be taken as 
official expressions of the National Conference of Bar Examiners' policy unless so stated. Readers are invited to 
submit ideas for articles, personal points of view, letters for publication and articles. Correspondence should be 
addressed to the National Conference of Bar Examiners, 333 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60601. 
'Ihe1 ____ c_h_ai_··_4m_e_n_s_~_e_u_er _________ ~ 
To the Members of the Conference: 
This Chairman's letter is our joint effort, 
as the outgoing and incoming Chairmen of 
the Conference. It reflects the ~eality that 
the Conference is constantly undergoing 
change, transition and challenge. 
In the 1983-1984 year, both William 
Morris and Len Young Smith retired after 
long and productive service to the Confer-
ence. During this year, we have honored 
Joe E. Covington on his retirement as the 
Conference's Director of Testing, and we 
have welcomed Joseph R. Julin as the new 
Director of Testing, Research and Devel-
opment. The office of the Director has 
moved from Columbia, Missouri to Gaines-
ville, Florida. 
The Conference is in the process of con-
ducting a self-study. (If you have not re-
sponded to the Chairman's letter in the 
May 1985 issue of The Bar Examiner, please 
do so.) The Conference and all Boards of 
Bar Examiners are considering the impact 
of Hoover v. Ronwin and Piper v. The Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire. Character and fit-
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ness programs are being evaluated. In Cali-
fornia, and various other states, new test-
ing programs and new procedures are 
being designed to assure the competence of 
applicants to the Bar. 
This summer marks a number of other 
transitions for the Conference. First, John 
Germany has retired as Chairman of the 
Multistate Bar Examination Committee. 
John, a former Chairman of the Confer-
ence, has served the Conference and the 
Multistate Bar Examination with unflag-
ging dedication . In his work with Joe Cov-
ington and the members of the MBE Com-
mittee, John has played a key role in 
moving the MBE program forward; in 
improving the quality of the MBE and 
assuring its validity and reliability; and in 
addressing the complex and demanding 
problems that the Conference and the 
jurisdictions continually face. John's com-
mitment has set a high standard of respon-
sibility to our profession. We take this op-
portunity to thank John for many tasks 
well done and his exemplary leadership. 
Stuart Lampe, who has served the Con-
ference so ably as its Secretary for many 
years, th is year asked not to be renomi-
nated for that position. If the Board of 
Managers has an " institutional memory," 
then Stuart has been it . The Board will 
miss Stuart, and his successors will have a 
very lofty standard to meet. 
Another transition comes with Wayne 
Denton's election to the Board of Manag-
ers ex officio as the Chairman of the Confer-
ence's Committee of Bar Admission Admin-
istrators . Wayne succeeds the indefatigable 
Marlyce Gholston in that position . The 
Conference can never sufficiently ack-
nowledge the contributions to the admis-
sions process by people such as Marlyce 
and Wayne and the Administrators whom 
they represent . 
In addition to Wayne Denton, the Con-
ference welcomes three new members of 
the Board: Beverly Tarpley of Texas, Mar-
vin Barkin of Florida and Stuart Duhl of 
Illinois . The Board continues to draw its 
members from the ranks of people who 
are, or have been, bar examiners around 
the country. The Conference will offer 
them opportunities for service, ~nteresting 
occupation and association with a fine 
group of women and men dedicated to 
maintaining the highest standards so that 
people can continue, in Holmes' words," to 
live greatly in the law." 
Sincerely, 
~~, 
Robert J. Muldoon, Jr. 
Chairman 
Sumner T. Bernstein 
Immediate Past Chairman 
Chairman's Letter I 3 
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This essay is a slightly reworked version of the introduc-
tion lo the author's book American Legal Ethics 
(1985). Copyright 1985 by Mallhew Bender & Co. , 
Inc. ; reprinted with permission. Portions of this essay 
originally appeared as an article in The University 
of Baltimore Law Forum, Fall, 1983 , p. 6, and 
are used here with the permission of that journal. 
Getting Serious About Legal Ethics 
by Thomas L. Shaffer 
here seems to be a differ-
ence between saying to a naughty child, "A 
good girl does not turn the garden hose on 
her grandmother," and, "If you turn the 
garden hose on your grandmother, you're 
going to be in trouble." 
American legal ethics deserves to call 
itself ethics to the extent that it focuses on 
the first kind of statement. Ethics is not a 
matter of staying out of trouble. It is a 
matter of being good. The ultimate ethical 
question for American lawyers is whether 
it is possible, in America, to be a lawyer and 
a good person-and, if so, how. Law is rele-
vant to this question, but it will never be 
enough; and it will not be relevant in the 
same way that law is relevant to the study 
of contracts or of federal income taxation. 
This approach to legal ethics-to see 
legal ethics as ethics- will preserve or re-
vive in the university and in the profession 
an ancient discipline: the study of morals as 
that subject has been of interest in philo-
sophy, theology, literature, and history. It 
aims to locate and clean up and weigh the 
roots of behavior and of admonition. 
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This is a far more personal venture than 
study of codes of professional ethics-
which are not ethics, but administrative 
regulation. A person accounts for himself 
and examines himself when she or he stu-
dies morals . This personal (or, as ethics 
scholars sometimes call it, pre-rational) 
concern is a necessary part of the agenda in 
ethics.1 Legal ethics should study morals in 
this personally relevant way, but it should 
try in addition to study morals (to use 
Thomas More's phrase) " in the tangle of 
the mind."2 That is, with the discipline and 
rigor and civility that we American lawyers 
observe when we talk about the rule against 
perpetuities or the First Amendment. There 
is no inconsistency between habits of com-
passion and habits of rigor; the best people 
in our profession have always had both. 
If lawyers really studied ethics they 
would also study their culture. Those who 
have preserved the study of ethics in the 
West have been at home in every corner of 
our civilization, among Greek philoso-
phers, among biblical Hebrews, in the 
church. Legal ethics should be comfortable 
with thinkers from Augustine to Maimo-
nides, Aquinas to Karl Barth, John Calvin 
and Martin Luther to the Niebuhrs and 
Martin Buber-all of these as well as the 
great American teachers of legal ethics, 
David Hoffman, George Sharswood, 
Thomas Goode Jones, Henry Drinker, and 
all the rest.3 
In these two ways (the personal and the 
cultural) legal ethics is in part a considera-
tion of Plato's Republic-of the conversation 
between Socrates and Thrasymachus, in 
which Socrates decided that the two of 
them would discover justice in the way 
they treated one another.4 And it is in part 
a consideration of everything that went 
into making each of us who she or he is, 
and that went into making our communi-
ties what they are. 
I got a lasting lesson in legal ethics in the 
faculty lounge one day, when I came upon a 
colleague who was reading the latest issue 
of Sports Illustrated. "You know," he said, 
"they give Earl Campbell the highest praise 
you can give a Texan." (My colleague is a 
Texan.) 
"Oh," I said. "What is that?" 
"They say he had a good mama." 
Earl Campbell's mother is personal to 
him, of course, but my colleague claimed 
also a cultural importance, for all Texans, 
in the fact that this prominent Texan has a 
good mother. The ethical lesson was per-
sonal and cultural: I doubt that our legal 
ethics will be real for us, personally or cul-
turally, if we leave our mothers out of it, 
even if including our mothers reduces the 
time we have available for codes and cases. 
Because each of us values good mothers in 
all of our lives, we are able to find value in 
Socrates' dialogue about justice. He says to 
Thrasymachus: (I) We are going to figure 
out, as thinking people, what justice is. (2) 
We are going to begin with the discovery-
a discovery I just noticed, or remembered-
that justice is a virtue;s justice is something 
people give to one another. (3) And there-
fore, as we proceed, let's try to notice and 
learn from one another what justice is-
from the way we treat one another. Justice 
is a moral subject, and an interesting sub-
ject, and is therefore an ethical subject; eth-
Thomas L. Shaffer, 8.A., ].D., LL.D.; member of the 
Indiana Bar. Professor of Law, Washing/on and Lee 
University. 
ics can be defined as the discussion of (a) 
what is interesting (b) in morals. Justice as 
ethics-that is, as a virtue-has an agenda 
that is personal and an agenda that is 
culturaJ.6 
Socrates had learned somewhere (maybe 
from his parents) (probably from his par-
ents) that a good person treats other per-
sons as creatures like himself . In a discur-
sive, virtually academic setting, he put the 
label "justice" on what he already knew. 
That procedure will also be important in 
modern professional discourse, where law-
yers, old and young, learn how to treat 
their clients. A human person, especially 
one up close, is what Justice James Wilson 
called the noblest work of God; much more 
important, he said, than the government.7 
It is wrong to use a person as the occasion 
of another person's profit or learning or 
entertainment. This point has personal 
significance; it has professional signifi-
cance-it was the turning point in the 
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Socrates-Thrasymachus conversation-
and it has cultural significance: Socrates 
did not call his discovery good manners; he 
called it justice. 
Both stories-the one about Mr. Camp-
bell's mother and Socrates's discovery that 
a conversation about justice shows what 
justice is-are interesting and they are 
about morals. Those facts make them ethi-
cal. Ethics is the consideration of what is 
interesting in morals. 
Vicarious Morals. Universities and pro-
fessions deal with interesting subjects by 
cutting them up into little pieces; legal 
ethics is only a piece of ethics . Our subject 
involves what a lawyer should do as a law-
yer; that is a specific jurisdiction, but we will 
do well not to let it get narrow on us. It can 
be claimed-it has, often, been claimed by 
American lawyers-that being a lawyer is a 
way to become a good person.a Most of us 
lawyers think, at least, that being a lawyer 
is compatible with being a good person. We 
hope that the lawyer part of us does not 
destroy goodness. It is still possible, in living 
as a lawyer, to ask ourselves broad moral 
questions-such as: 
-What am I up to in my client's life? 
-How is my client changing because of 
me? 
-How am I changing because of him-
because of what I think he wants me to 
do? 
Those are broad questions. They are also 
vicarious . That latter fact narrows inquiry, 
but, maybe, those questions are more inter-
esting because they are vicarious. For exam-
ple, if I ask you whether I should lie to the 
judge, you will likely tell me that I should 
not. If I ask you if I should endeavor to help 
the poor and the ignorant, you will likely 
tell me that I should. Professional ethics 
takes its special jurisdiction, not from those 
questions, but from the fact that profes-
sional life includes being of assistance to 
people who have good reasons for lying to 
judges and spurning the poor. 
Professor Harry W. Jones said in a lec-
ture at Villanova,9 "One of the best men I 
have ever known, my Sunday School 
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teacher .. . was ... a vastly successful practic-
ing lawyer and a person of stiffly un-
compromising rectitude .... How could he 
have accommodated his keen sense of jus-
tice to the partisan ethics of the profession 
he thought of as his life's vocation?" Pro-
fessor Jones found it interesting to ask 
whether his teacher would have helped a 
person who had been indicted for a violent 
crime; whether the teacher would be will-
ing to conceal incriminating evidence, or to 
cast guilt on an innocent person. Such 
questions became interesting because they 
involved a client. They would have been 
less interesting if they had involved con-
cealment or false accusation by the Sunday-
school teacher in his own behalf. If that had 
been the case, Professor Jones would have 
gone to a different class, or maybe to a 
different church. 
This vicarious focus gives legal ethics 
two kinds of tension: (a) between a law-
yer's morals and the morals of his client, 
and (b) between a lawyer's morals and his 
sense of public and professional duty. Those 
tensions are topical in legal ethics. We who 
work together in the law are aware of 
these two tensions; we feel them. These 
two tensions are evident also in the history 
of American legal ethics. Chief Justice 
Roger Brooke Taney was attorney general 
of Maryland before he became a judge. As a 
lawyer he argued a case involving impor-
ters in interstate commerce. As a judge, 
years later, he decided the same question. 
When he was an advocate, he argued for a 
result that favored Maryland; when he was 
a judge he decided the other way. The 
inconsistency was, to his 19th-century gen-
tleman's conscience, a bother-a moral 
bother. He felt he had to explain himself. "I 
argued the case .. . and ... at that time per-
suaded myself that I was right .... But 
further and more mature reflection con-
vinced me that the rule [finally] laid down 
by the Supreme Court is a just and safe 
one," he said. "The question was a very 
difficult one."10 Why difficult? Why is the 
inconsistent behavior even noticed? Be ca use Taney 
felt so tender about not following as judge 
a position he had urged as a legal rule when 
he was employed to be an advocate for a 
was a man of principle. He gained renown 
as a modern American lawyer-hero when 
Robert Bolt's play "A Man for All Seasons" 
became popular in this country in the 
1960s.13 More did not go to his death say-
ing that martyrdom is a gentleman's lot; he 
died announcing three principles: the legal 
principle that silence is not treason, the 
moral principle that one should not take an 
oath falsely, and the religious principle that 
the King of England could not exercise 
ultimate spiritual authority. He also went 
to his death with significant self-deception 
about what was going on in England. Part 
of his self-deception was the notion that 
principles were an adequate way to des-
cribe his moral life. 
David Hoffman's Resolutions are almost 
moral principles (he was fond of maxims), 
and so are the greater parts of the earliest 
codes of legal ethics, such as Judge Jones's 
1887 Alabama Code, and the 1908 Ameri-
can Bar Association Canons. They all con-
tain deceptions analogous to Thomas 
More's. 
The claim that American legal ethics 
rests on principles suggests an ancient con-
trast between virtues and principles as 
being fundamentally significant in morals, 
a contrast between being good and being 
right, a contrast between Aristotle, who did 
not announce principles, and most of mod-
ern philosophical ethics and jurisprudence, 
which rarely announces anything else. The 
difference is between accounting for mor-
als with the Seoul Handbook, which talks 
about qualities, or dispositions, or habits 
such as bravery, cheerfulness, honesty, and 
loyalty, instead of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, which is a set of principles.14 
This difference is subtle at first , but it is 
real and it is important. When you get 
going on it, you are doing nothing less than 
invoking Earl Campbell's mother in legal 
ethics . You are discovering the fact that 
there is in our lives moral material that is 
deeper and more explanatory than princi-
ples: Maybe we come to see something as a 
moral problem because of this deeper mate-
rial. The most interesting moments in 
e thics deal not with right versus wrong, 
but with right versus right; n ot w ith which 
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moral rules you follow, but with how you 
live with all the moral rules you are sup-
posed to follow. Aristotle understood that; 
so did Atticus Finch. 
The legal ethics of the two kingdoms l s say that 
it is possible to be a good person and an 
American lawyer and that the way to do it 
is to separate one's personal morals from 
one's professional morals . This point of 
view says that it is possible to be a good 
lawyer and a good person too, but rarely the 
twain shall meet. The purest doctrinal 
expression of the two kingdoms in Ameri-
can legal ethics is the development of the 
adversary ethic in the late nineteenth cen-
tury.16 The adversary ethic says that it is 
selfish and immoral to refuse to do for 
clients what clients want done. Modern 
lawyer-heroes often announce this point 
of view (for example G eorge V. Higgins's 
Boston criminal defense lawyer Jerry Ken-
nedy17), but the moral argument has an-
cient roots. My way of naming it is bor-
rowed from Martin Luther; much of his 
thinking on the point came from St. Augus-
tine-and from the New Testament. There 
are personal tensions here, too: It is diffi-
cult for many of us to figure out a way to 
live bifurcated moral lives, and it is almost 
always unsatisfactory to answer that bi-
furcation is what the legal system requires 
of us. 
Professional legal ethics finds moral author-
ity in the profession itself. Judge (Dean) 
Sharswood's 1854 essay on legal ethics 
invoked the morals of the fraternity.is 
Sharswood, who was a magnificently club-
bable man, told his students that they would 
not go wrong if they sought in everything 
the approval of their professional elders. 
This point of view is prominent in the 
modern lawyer stories of Louis Auchin-
closs and James Gould Cozzens. The no-
tion that the profession had or could have 
moral authority led to the founding of the 
first American bar associations in the 
1870s, but the notion has ancient roots. 
The earliest hero stories in the West are 
stories of warriors and adventurers who 
did what they were given to do, and who 
learned from their colleagues how to do 
what they were given to do. This point of 
view preserves the tensions of modern 
professional life: Law students are familiar 
with the morality that calls on them to 
imitate their elders, but they are also famil-
iar with Watergate, security frauds, and 
murky characters who hand around police 
courts and hospital emergency rooms look-
ing for legal business. 
The legal ethics of dissent. Rebellion is a 
persistent strain in the American legal pro-
fession; the American Revolution was, 
uniquely, a lawyer's revolution, as all of our 
subsequent national revolutions have been. 
Rebellion is noticeable in the "vulgar bar" 
of urban stories, in the frontier profession 
in America, and among modern lawyers 
who find unbearable elitism in bar associa-
tions and among gentlemen. Ephraim Tutt, 
lawyer-hero of more than a hundred short 
stories in the old Saturday Evening Post, is a 
20th-century example of this point of view, 
as are Higgins's Jerry Kennedy and the 
wonderful, real-life Fanny Hotlzmann.19 
These lawyers seem to believe, and some-
times say, that the way to be a good person 
and a lawyer is to ignore what prosperous, 
elder lawyers say to do. In a more positive 
analysis, the morals of those who dissent 
are likely to be more personal and cultural 
than professional. They refuse to make a 
morality out of procedures such as the 
adversary ethic. They make the useful 
point that a client is a person before he is a 
moral problem. Some of them see the law 
as a means to social change. These last talk, 
as the civil-liberties lawyer Charles Mor-
gan does,20 not of law and order, but of law 
against order. 
• • • 
How does one talk in the profession 
about such moral point of view? The how-
do-we-talk question, to Socrates, was sub-
stantive; the answer to it contains the 
answer to what justice is . The most com-
mon method for talking about moral ques-
tions in law school, and especially in the 
study of professional responsibility, has 
been to talk in quandaries. Our penchant 
for the study of cases in law carries over 
into a preference for cases in morals, and so 
we present a dilemma and say, "What 
would you do?" This method is attractive, 
unavoidable, and limited. 
For one thing, the case method in morals 
overlooks the fact that a quandary becomes a 
quandary because of morals. Morals may 
solve quandaries but, before that, they cre-
ate quandaries. Jean-Paul Sartre presents 
the case of the World War II French patriot 
who is the sole support of his mother: 
Should he leave home and join the Free 
French Army, or stay at home and care for 
his mother? There would be no quandary if 
the man in the story had not learned, some-
where, to love his country-and not only 
his country but a particular view of what 
his country is. There would be no quan-
dary if he had not learned, somewhere, to 
love his mother, and not only to love her, 
but to express his love in a particular way. 
Sartre uses the story to make the existen-
tialist claim that our morals are the product 
of our choices; they are morals only be-
cause we choose to make them so. I think 
he came up with a good quandary, but, in 
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figuring it out, he ignored culture; he did 
not take account in a truthful way of Earl 
Campbell's mother. The mother in the Sar-
tre example is not a mystery and a source 
of value, as real mothers are; she is only a 
difficulty. Sartre might have done better if 
he had been a Texan. 
The maternalistic lawyer who has as a 
client a teenager in trouble in juvenile 
court may be in a quandary when she com-
pares doing for her client what her client 
wants done: She wants her client to grow 
up. Her client wants to be restored to his 
colleagues in the alley. The state boys' 
school would dry him out and teach him a 
trade, but he is not anxious to be enrolled 
there. Procedural notions point in one 
direction; the wisdom-such as it is-of a 
culture that imposes values on children, as 
any culture inevitably does, points in an-
other direction. But the quandary will not 
be there if mama-knows-best lawyer mor-
ality is strong enough to overcome her law 
school acculturation to free choice and due 
process. (Atticus Finch, was a remarkably 
paternalistic lawyer, but Atticus never went 
to law school.) The quandary would not be 
there if moral, not legal, notions of civil 
liberty were strong and the determination 
to protect the weak were not as strong as 
our American-lawyer-gentleman stories 
make it . One who discusses morals in the 
context of a quandary needs to know what 
he is doing, and what he is not doing. 
For another thing, quandary ethics has 
Sartre's existentialist bias. It tends to equate 
one's morals with one's taste in beer. It 
tends to make a fetish (rather than a 
virtue)21 of tolerance and to avoid intellec-
tual rigor. In a characteristic display of this, 
one of us presents the case of the maternal-
istic lawyer and the teenager, and then 
directs argument over it for a while, and 
then moves on to the next quandary. We do 
not evaluate the moral arguments we make 
to one another. It is not true that every 
point of view in ethics is as valuable as 
every other point of view. A good deal of 
moral argument is fatuous, and can be 
shown to be fatuous. Part of our profes-
sional calling is to think about our profes-
sional morals . If the topic of discussion 
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were covenants-running-with-the-land, 
we would see that in a moment. The First 
Resolution in Spencer's Case, that a tenant's 
covenant to build a bridge cannot benefit a 
successor owner of the land, is a silly rule, 
and the discussion in property class will not 
go on long before someone notices and 
describes the silliness. The general attitude 
among property teachers is that such judg-
ment and analysis must occur or students 
will not learn to think like lawyers. Quan-
dary ethics is weak because it does not call 
upon the intellectural rigor we demand in 
our property courses. 
For some reason, possibly because values 
are often religious and Americans have the 
anti-intellectural notion that it is not civil 
to talk about religion, we have not ana-
lyzed and debated moral notions with the 
openness and discipline we bring to legal 
notions . Quandaries keep us in the intel-
lectual shallows; they make it comfortable 
for us to go on a little hike through a field 
of moral brambles and then come home 
thinking we have learned something. 
Finally, quandaries hide people, as Sar-
tre's example hid the mother of the French 
patriot. Quandaries are abstract. It is prob-
ably the case that no one would retain his 
clarity on the answer to a moral quandary, 
such as Sartre's example or the juvenile 
court case, after he gets to know the people 
involved. For this reason, I find it useful to 
read and think and talk about stories. Sto-
ries display morals more than announce 
them. They involve quandary and princi-
pies, but they put quandary in a narrative, 
human context; and they show that princi-
ples are something we live with more than 
live by. The context cuts the quandary and 
the principle down to size. A story helps 
give the quandary and the principle appro-
priate amounts of weight, that is, the 
weight they have in life. Stories are in fact 
the way we know what to do about the pain 
and the tragedy of those who come into 
our professional lives. 
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Readmission and Reinstatement, a Role 
for Bar Examiners: A Florida Experience 
by Stanley A . Spring 
Mode! Rules for Lawyer Dis-
cipline and Disability Proceedings (Model 
Rules) have been developed by the ABA 
Standing Committee on Professional D is-
cipline to assist jurisdictions in implemen-
tation of Lawyer Standards and are pub-
lished in Professional Discipline fo r Lawyers and 
Judges, a publication of the National Center 
for Professional Responsibility of the ABA. 
The Model Rules and all jurisdictions 
regard disbarment as the most severe of all 
lawyer disciplines. The sanction of disbar-
ment results in removal of the license to 
practice law. A substantial period of t ime, 
usually three to five years, is required by 
most jurisdictions before application for 
readmission is even permitted. As indica-
tion of the finality of disbarment is the use 
of the term readmission in the Model Rules 
and most jurisdictions w hen identifying 
the process and procedures required of the 
disbarred lawyer to again secure a license 
and resume practice of the law. 
Reinstatement is used in the Model Rules 
and most jurisdictions to identify the pro-
cess and procedures requir ed of the lawyer 
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after the sanction of suspension, disability, 
resignation in some cases, and in other 
situations where fitnes s to resu me pract ice 
must be shown after a period of inter-
rupted practice not involving disbarment. 
The Model Rules, as w ell as Florida rules, 
provide that a judgment of disabarment, as 
well as resignation, terminates a person's 
status as a lawyer by removal of the license 
to practice law. In resignation, as well as 
disbarment, readmission is and should be 
used rather than reinstatement w hen des-
cribing those procedures required to again 
secure a license to practice law. 
Suspension, by definition, connotes tem-
porary disqualification, and reinstatement is 
used when describing the procedures neces-
sary in removing temporary disqualifica-
t ion to pract ice where neither the license 
nor the court's jurisdiction over the lawyer 
has been removed or terminated during 
the period of suspension . 
Readmission 
The Model Rules recommend that after 
disbarment, the lawyer ought no t be able 
to apply for readmission until at least five 
years after the effective date of disbarment 
and all petitions for readmission should be 
filed with and considered by the discipli-
nary agency. The disciplinary agency has 
no independent mission or original juris-
diction in determining fitness for admis-
sion and licensure to practice law. 
In contrast, procedures contained and 
provided for in The Florida Bar Integration 
Rule, Article XI and its Bylaws, (Rules of 
The Supreme Court of Florida regulating 
lawyers admitted to practice in Florida), 
provide that no application for readmission 
may be tendered within three years after 
the date of disbarment, or such longer 
period as the court might determine in the 
disbarment order. Further, and significantly 
different than the Model Rules, a disbarred 
Florida lawyer may be readmitted only 
upon full compliance with the rules and 
regulations set forth for those governing 
admission to the Florida Bar. Effective 
since December 1, 1972, this rule regulat-
ing lawyers in Florida requires a disbarred 
lawyer to make application for readmission 
to the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, 
rather than the disciplinary agency, as 
recommended in the Model Rules and as 
followed in most jurisdictions. 
The Florida Board of Bar Examiners 
have established and developed over the 
years successful and tested procedures to 
determine the character, fitness, and gen-
eral qualifications of persons applying for a 
license to practice law. These procedures 
include the successful taking of the Florida 
Bar Examination to insure competency in 
the law. A disbarred Florida lawyer to again 
resume practice of the law must, as any 
other applicant, satisfy the Florida Board of 
Bar Examiners of these same qualifications 
including the successful retaking of the 
Florida Bar Examination. 
The Florida Board of Bar Examiners has 
by its very mission developed the neces-
sary expertise to satisfy itself that each 
applicant recommended to the court for 
licensure is not only of good character but 
also has adequate knowledge of the law, 
including the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, the standards and ideals of the pro-
Stanley A. Spring, a member of the Florida Bar Profes-
sional Ethics Committee, is retired as Staff Counsel and 
Director of the Legal Division of the Florida Bar. He was 
responsible for lawyer discipline and regulation, ethics, 
and the unauthorized practice of law. The views expressed 
in this article are those of the author and not of any 
organization with which he is or has been affiliated. 
fession, and is in all ways a fit person to 
take the oath and perform the obligations 
and responsibilities of an attorney. 
It is not unusual for the Supreme Court 
of Florida in disbarment orders to impose 
periods ranging from four to twenty years, 
rather than the minimum three years, 
after which the disbarred lawyer may then 
make application for readmission. 
Presently pending before the Supreme 
Court of Florida is a proposed rule change 
submitted by the Board of Governors of the 
Florida Bar providing that no application 
for readmission may be tendered within 
five years after the date of disbarment or 
such longer period as the court may order. 
Raising the minimum period before read-
mission after disbarment to five years, 
Florida would then conform to the time 
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standard set forth in the Model Rules for 
readmission application after disbarment. 
In the many meetings of the Florida Bar 
Board of Governors and its committees 
over the past several years during which 
changes to the rules regulating the Florida 
Bar were considered, no suggestion was re-
ceived from any source that consideration 
be given to returning readmission proce-
dures after disbarment from the Florida 
Board of Bar Examiners to the disciplinary 
agency. To the contrary, the Florida Board 
of Bar Examiners, who as a separate arm of 
the Supreme Court of Florida are indepen-
dent of any disciplinary agency, have dis-
charged their assigned responsibilities in re-
admission after disbarment so satisfactorily 
that the ABA Standing Committee on Pro-
fessional Discipline and other jurisdictions 
would be well served to give serious consid-
eration to adopting a rule similar to Florida 
having the bar admission agency, rather 
than the disciplinary agency, determining 
fitness for readmission after disbarment. 
Florida rules, along with the majority of 
jurisdictions and the Model Rules, do not 
authorize permanent disbarment. How-
ever, Florida rules do provide for a lawyer 
to resign with disciplinary proceedings 
pending, and if the petition to resign states 
that it is without leave to apply for read-
mission permanently, such condition pre-
cludes any readmission . All other petitions 
for readmission after resignation with dis-
cipline pending may be filed within three 
years or such additional time as may be 
stated in the petition to resign and as 
reflected in the court order.accepting and 
approving the resignation. 
The Supreme Court of Florida has not 
hestitated to bind resigned members to 
their petition of permanent resignation, 
the court distinguishing that a judgment of 
disbarment does not authorize permanent 
disbarment in the sense that a disbarred 
lawyer may never petition for readmission. 
In effect, permanent disbarment does live 
in Florida but in a different form . Notwith-
standing that a permanent resignation has 
the same effect and goes beyond the dis-
barment rules, the readmission procedures 
after resignation with discipline pending 
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have not been assigned to the Florida 
Board of Bar Examiners as in disbarment. 
Rather, readmission after resignation with 
discipline pending, which as in disbarment 
requires a minimum of three years before 
readmission, has remained within and the 
responsibility of the disciplinary agency to 
determine those qualifications that are the 
business of the bar examiners. 
The Model Rules, in dealing with resigna-
tion while discipline is pending, treats the 
situation as a disbarment by consent rather 
than a special type resignation with its own 
set of special rules to cover the situation as 
Florida does. Florida would be well advised 
to treat resignation with discipline pending 
as a disbarment by consent, as recom-
mended in the Model Rules. Readmission 
after resignation with discipline pending 
would then remain with the Board of Bar 
Examiners, as it does after disbarment. 
Readmission procedures after a resigna-
tion, whether or not triggered by pending 
discipline, should be assigned to and the 
responsibility of the bar admission agency 
rather than the disciplinary agency. Read-
mission procedures after disbarment being 
assigned to the Florida Board of Bar Exa-
miners, as noted before, has worked well 
and with uniformity. The assignment of 
readmission procedures after resignation 
' . ; 
' 
to bar examiners would be logical and con-
sistent with their mission. Readmission in 
Florida was routine after disbarment while 
administered by the disciplinary agency. 
Since 1972, when readmission after dis-
barment was assigned by the court to the 
Florida Board of Bar Examiners of seventy-
three lawyers subsequently disbarred, one 
has been found fully qualified and readmit-
ted to practice. 
The Model Rules, in providing standards 
for readmission after disbarment, given 
general and broad direction to the discipli-
nary agency in determining fitness for 
readmittance. 
Model Rule Standard 6 .2 provides that 
the lawyer should not be able to apply for 
readmission until at least five years after 
the effective date of disbarment and should 
not be readmitted unless he or she can 
show by clear and convincing evidence: 
rehabilitation, fitness to practice, compe-
tence, and compliance with all applicable 
discipline or disability orders and rules. 
The standard does not provide uniform 
procedures or examinations within the 
jurisdictions for use in determining with 
consistency and accuracy fitness to prac-
tice, the very mission of bar examiners 
who have long since developed valid exam-
inations and procedures to determine with 
uniformity fitness to practice. 
In order to bring about uniformity, fair-
ness to lawyers and the public in determin-
ing fitness to once again practice law, Flor-
ida has accomplished this, in the case of 
disbarred lawyers, by using the already 
existing machinery and experience of the 
Board of Bar Examiners. Attempting to 
develop a parallel body of rules, proce-
dures, and examinations within the disci-
plinary system that would accomplish the 
same task in Florida had not been success-
ful in the past . Although the rules in Flor-
ida still provide that readmission after 
resignation remains within the disciplinary 
agency, a case can be made for also assign-
ing to the bar examiners this responsibility, 
particularly in those cases involving pend-
ing discipline, which require a minimum 
three-year separation from practice before 
any application for readmission may be 
made, and those resignations of any type 
involving a substantial period of separation 
from the practice of law. 
Reinstatement 
In treating reinstatement after suspen-
sion, neither Florida, the Model Rules, nor 
any other jurisdictions I'm aware of, have 
assigned this responsibility to bar examin-
ers. It remains for the disciplinary system 
to determine fitness for reinstatement 
after suspension. 
The Model Rules recommend that sus-
pension be for a specified period of time not 
to exceed three years. Pointing out in those 
cases where the misconduct has been so 
severe that even a three year suspension 
would not be adequate, the lawyer should 
be disbarred. A specified period of suspe-
sion futher provides in each case the basis 
for a time certain in which the reinstate-
ment process may be commenced after 
suspension. 
Reinstatement proceedings after suspen-
sion most often require at least ninety days 
to complete, and in some instances, a much 
longer period of time is required. 
Requiring reinstatement in all cases of 
suspension regardless of the duration of 
the suspension would serve as an addi-
tional sanction where the suspension has 
been ordered for a short period of time. 
The Model Rules recommend reinstate-
ment from a suspension of six months or 
less be automatic upon the expiration of 
the period of suspension along with the 
filing of necessary affidavits of compliance 
with the orders and conditions applicable 
in the particular case. 
Florida rules provide for automatic rein-
statement in suspensions of three months 
or less as no proof of rehabilitation or 
further hearings are required. For greater 
clarity, a rule change has been proposed 
providing the suspension be for ninety 
days or less, ra ther than three months or 
less. The three month or ninety day rule in 
Florida authorizing automatic reinstate-
ment rather than six months, as recom-
mended in the Model Rules, has created no 
real problems in Florida, nor given rise to 
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any efforts to provide a longer period of 
suspension before rehabilitation or rein-
statement hearings would be required. 
The reinstatement procedures after sus-
pension recommended in the Model Rules 
follow those recommended for readmis-
sion after disbarment. The Model Rules 
recommend reinstatement should require 
the lawyer who has been suspended to 
show by clear and convincing evidence 
rehabilitation, compliance with all applica-
ble discipline or disability orders, and a fit-
ness to practice with current competence. 
Factual issues involved are assigned to a 
disciplinary hearing committee for recom-
mendations to a disciplinary board and to 
the court, following the same procedures 
for readmission after disbarment. 
Florida rules for reinstatement proceed-
ings after a suspension of over three 
months require of the lawyer a showing by 
clear and convincing evidence of rehabilita-
tion and are set forth in greater detail in 
the rules. The petition for reinstatement 
after suspension is referred to a referee, a 
trial judge, who conducts the hearing in 
the same manner as a disciplinary trial, but 
pleadings other than the reinstatement 
petition are not required. The matter to be 
decided by the referee is the fitness of the 
suspended lawyer to resume the practice of 
law. The rules place emphasis upon the 
protection of the public. The petitioner 
must establish that his or her conduct will 
justify the restored confidence of the pub-
lic, professional contemporaries, and of the 
Supreme Court of Florida. The petitioner 
must sustain the burden of proving fitness 
to resume practice in terms of integrity as 
well as professional competency. 
Some of the elements that have been 
used by the petitioner to sustain this bur-
den in Florida are: 
1. Strict compliance with the original dis-
ciplinary order of suspension. 
2. Evidence of unimpeachable character 
and moral standing in the community. 
3. Evidence of good reputation for profes-
sional ability and competence. 
4. Evidence of lack of malice and ill feeling 
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toward those who were compelled to 
bring about the original disciplinary 
proceedings. 
5. Personal assurances, supported by cor-
roborating evidence, revealing a sense 
of repentance as well as a desire and 
intention to conduct himself or herself 
in an exemplary fashion in the future . 
6 . In cases involving misappropriation, a 
showing of restitution. 
7. A showing by petitioner of conduct in 
the life of the community to justify a 
conclusion that petitioner has been im-
pressed with the importance of ethical 
conduct and is morally equipped to re-
sume a postion of honor and trust 
among peers at the bar. 
Florida Rules further require the follow-
ing items to be furnished by the petitioner: 
1. Authorization to the District Director 
of Internal Revenue for release of peti-
tioner's federal income tax returns since 
original admission to the bar. (Florida 
has no state income tax. ) 
2 . A copy of all disciplinary judgments pre-
viously entered against the petitioner. 
3. All specifics in the disciplinary proceed-
ings that resulted in the suspension or 
resignation from which reinstatement 
is being sought. 
4. Personal data since suspension, includ-
ing occupation, income, residence, cred-
itors, landlords, obligations, arrests, any 
civil or criminal proceedings . 
5 . Applications made for licenses requir-
ing proof of good character. 
6. Proceedings involving his or her stand-
ing as a member of any organization or 
as a license holder subsequent to the 
suspension. 
The items and examples above are not all 
inclusive and individual petitions may re-
quire more or varied information depend-
ing upon the original disciplinary order. 
A copy of the petition is filed with the 
Supreme Court of Florida and is served 
_,. 
~ 





upon the disciplinary agency for investiga-
tion. The disciplinary agency assumes the 
role of adversary in reinstatement proceed-
ings as it does in all disciplinary matters. 
The investigation of reinstatements, as 
conducted by the disciplinary agency in 
Florida, has been criticized in the past on 
several occasions by members of the Board 
of Governors who supervise the discipli-
nary system for the court in Florida. Criti-
cism was prompted by reinstatement of 
lawyers with whom board members were 
familiar and believed were not worthy of 
reinstatement. 
In Florida where rehabilitation and fit-
ness to resume practice must be shown by 
the petitioner, little variation exists in the 
outcome of the proceedings as conducted 
by the disciplinary system. During the 
1983-84 bar year, five reinstatement hear-
ings were held and all five petitioners were 
recommended for reinstatement. The Su-
preme Court, by its own review, denied 
three. During the first nine-month period 
of the 1984-85 bar year, eight reinstate-
men t hearings were held and all eight peti-
tioners were recommended for reinstate-
ment as well. The Supreme C:ourt, by its 
own review, denied one. Since July 1, 1983, 
every petitioner for reinstatement requir-
ing a hearing showing rehabilitation has 
been recommended to the court for rein-
statement. Referees in some cases have re-
quired little demonstration of the lofty 
goals of rehabilitation. There is little to 
contest in a reinstatement proceeding if 
the disciplinary agency has not changed 
hats as bar examiners and conducted a tho-
rough and complete investigation to deter-
mine the petitioner's fitness to resume the 
practice of law. This is a most difficult as-
signment without a system of uniform test-
ing and examinations to insure competency. 
The disciplinary agency in Florida, in 
conducting a reinstatement investigation, 
does some or all of the following: furnish 
copies of the petition for reinstatement to 
concerned Board of Governor members, 
local bar associations, and to discipline 
committees which brought the original 
charges . An attempt is made to locate and 
interview those involved in the original 
disciplinary case, including complainants, 
referee, any other counsel involved, as well 
as witnesses, prosecutors, probation offic-
ers, and judge, where a criminal case gave 
rise to the suspension, or similarly if civil 
litigation was involved. Consideration was 
given, but not authorized by the Board of 
Governors, to obtain any pertinent com-
ments regarding the lawyer seeking rein-
statement by publication of the pending 
proceedings in the Florida Bar News, which 
publication reaches all members of the 
Florida Bar. 
In reinstatement hearings, as now con-
ducted, few witnesses ever come forward 
to give negative or derogatory information 
concerning the petitioner. Under current 
rules, without a most detailed, intensive, 
and penetrating investigation by the disci-
plinary agency, reinstatement of the peti-
tioner is assured. 
Depending upon the referee conducting 
the reinstatement proceedings and the in-
vestigation conducted by the disciplinary 
agency, the burden upon the petitioner 
most often results in completing the peti-
tion, payment of necessary deposits and 
costs, and producing some lawyers or 
judges who will speak well of the peti-
tioner. Rarely does a referee require the 
petitioner to submit to any type of testing 
or examination to insure competency in 
current law, ethics, or the rules, regardless 
of the duration of the suspension or sepa-
ration from practice. 
Readmission and Reinstatement/ 17 
The Model Rules recommend that the 
disciplinary agency, as in readmission after 
disbarment proceedings, conduct reinstate-
ment hearings and make final recommen-
dations to the court. 
The Board of Governors, in accepting 
their responsibilities as the governing body 
of the disciplinary system of the Florida 
Bar, have attempted through several pro-
posed rule changes to bring about addi-
tional improvement and uniformity in rein-
statement proceedings . 
One proposed change would provide that 
a suspension of more than ninety days may 
require passage of the Florida Bar exami-
nation. Another change would provide 
that suspensions which continue more than 
three years shall require passage of the 
Florida Bar examination within one year 
prior to reinstatement. 
Proof of competency required in rein-
statement proceedings where discipline had 
been involved would then include a certifica-
tion by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners 
of the successful passage of the bar exami-
nation subsequent to the date of suspen-
sion. The successful passage of the Florida 
Bar examination by being available to refe-
rees in suspensions of over ninety days and 
being required in suspensions of over three 
years will, no doubt, be used frequently in 
suspensions of less than three years to 
satisfy the requirement of competency. 
A further change proposed in the rules 
would provide that lawyers who retire, 
resign without discipline, or have been 
separated from the bar for non-payment of 
dues for a period of three to five years may 
be required to successfully complete all or a 
portion of the Florida Bar examination 
before reinstatement. Those who have 
been separated for a period of five years or 
more would not be reinstated except upon 
certification by the Florida Board of Bar 
Examiners, as currently required by the 
rules in readmission after disbarment pro-
ceedings . The disciplinary agency would 
not have to determine, in these cases, as it 
currently does, fitness without a valid test 
or examination for competency. 
The Model Rules offer no specific recom-
mendations for determining proof of com-
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petency in reinstatement or readmission 
proceedings regardless of the reason or 
period of separation or suspension. 
Readmission and reinstatement proceed-
ings are necessary to prove rehabilitation 
of the laywer. Rehabilitation should reflect 
a fitness to resume the practice of law and 
requires a showing of the restoration 0f 
integrity, good character, and competence, 
the same qualities which were required of 
the lawyer for licensure. 
Disciplinary agencies are not and should 
not be charged with establishing proce-
dures and expertise to determine of a per-
son those qualities required for licensure. 
The disciplinary system is the structure es-
tablished to direct its talents and resources 
in developing procedures and expertise to 
ferret out of the law those who have dem-
onstrated 'by their conduct they are for 
some reason unable or unwilling to prop-
erly discharge their professional duties. 
Florida has been a leader in giving the 
Board of Bar Examiners as in readmission 
proceedings after disbarment the continu-
ing responsibility in determining those 
qualities required for licensure, where 
those same qualities are necessary to be 
demonstrated for readmission and rein-
statement as well. 
There continues in Florida a forward 
looking move toward greater involvement 
of the Board of Bar Examiners by recogniz-
ing and using their expertise and expe-
rience in all types of reinstatement proceed-
ings where fitness to practice and proof of 
competency are required to be shown. 
South Carolina's Rule 5 Works Well 
by Bruce Littlejohn 
The Constitution of South 
Carolina imposes on the supreme court the 
sole responsibility of determining those 
persons entitled to practice law and those 
persons who should be disbarred or oth-
erwise sanctioned. In 1979, I chaired a 
committee appointed to study admissions 
to our Bar. Our study necessarily came to 
involve legal education and, in tum, lawyer 
competency in general. 
In February 1982, I prepared, by request, 
an article for publication in the Bar Examiner 
entitled "Lawyer (in)Competency: Who is 
Responsible?" I have now been requested 
to comment upon how our Rule 5, which 
was adopted in 1979 as an outgrowth of 
our committee study, has worked. 
Rule 5 of the Rules for Admission to the 
Bar for South Carolina is directed to the 
applicant. It has nothing to do with the oper-
ation of any law school and we recognize 
their academic freedom to structure legal 
education. At the same time, I am sure the 
law schools recognize our constitutional 
duty to see that those persons admitted to 
the Bar are competent and worthy of hire. 
Competency is not easy to define, evalu-
ate or accomplish. Our committee study 
was inspired by observations of members 
of the supreme court that many young 
lawyers, and sometimes older ones too, 
were less than capable of representing 
their clients skillfully in the trial of a case. 
Rule 5 provides five basic approaches which 
are aimed at improving lawyer competency: 
(1) A requirement that the clerk of the 
supreme court communicate every sum-
mer with the pre-law advisors in South Ca-
rolina undergraduate schools and urge 
them to encourage students who expect to 
pursue a career at law to study English com-
position, English public speaking, United 
States history, accounting, economics, liter-
ature, political science, logic and philosophy. 
(2) We require that law students al(ply-
ing to stand for the bar exam in South Caro-
lina must have taken courses in the areas of 
contracts, property, constitutional law, bus-
iness law, civil procedure, commercial law, 
equity, evidence, legal writing and research, 
professional responsibility, taxation, torts, 
trial advocacy and domestic relations. 
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(3) We require every admittee to the Bar 
to have had eleven trial experiences before 
he or she may try a case alone: three in 
Criminal Court, three in Civil Court, three 
in Family Court, one in an administrative 
law hearing and one in an equity hearing. 
These experiences may be acquired by 
assisting an attorney or by observation of 
an entire trial. 
(4) A student practice rule has been 
promulgated. 
(5) Commencing in the fall of 1984, a 
thirty-hour "Bridge the Gap" Program is 
required of all applicants before admission. 
The impact of all of these is difficult to 
prove. Fortunately, we do not have to prove 
with mathematical certainty the benefits 
which admittees receive from these require-
ments. It is sufficient that we have a convic-
tion that students who have complied with 
these rules are better prepared to serve 
clients than students who have not had the 
benefit of these programs. 
Bruce Lilllejohn is Chief Justice of South Carolina . 
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I will now proceed to briefly discuss each. 
In the pre-law handbook of the Association 
of American Law Schools will be found the 
following : "The Association's responsibility 
in matters of legal education cannot be met 
by prescribing certain courses and extra-
curricular activities for students planning 
later to study law." Such a statement is com-
ing to be recognized as a disservice to the 
student, the lawyer and his client. The med-
ical profession requires study of certain 
subjects prior to admission to medical 
school. The law schools might well emulate 
the formula . Two important committees 
agree with us . 
In recent years, the American Bar' As-
sociation has appointed two committees: 
one chaired by Attorney Ronald J. Foulis of 
California to study legal education1 and one 
chaired by Attorney Herschel H. Friday of 
Arkansas to study professional compe-
tency.2 
The Foulis committee had this to say: 
. . . In our view, the time may be ripe for the 
reformulation of advisory statements on prele-
gal education. Certain perceived deficiencies 
may be more suitably remedied by prelegal than 
by legal education. The possibilities for action 
include the recommendation of a particularized 
prelaw curriculum or of certain prelaw majors, 
limited but specific course recommendation, or 
at a m inimum the dissemination of information 
about legal education and the legal profession 
that takes into account relevant, recent research 
findings . . . 
The Friday committee agreed with the 
Foulis committee and said: 
. .. Prelegal education is an important beginning 
in the eventual mastery of the knowledge and 
skills of the lawyer. The Foulis Report recom-
mended that the Section of Legal Education and 
Admissions to the Bar and the Association of 
American Law Schools (AALS) confer for the 
purpose of reexamining and rewriting the 1953 
AALS Statement of Prelegal Education to pro-
vide clearer and more concise guidelines for 
prelaw students . While the principal concern 
expressed in the Foulis Report relative to prelegal 
education was the need to master advanced 
writing skills and effective oral comunication, 
the report went on to support the view that 
underg r aduate educat ion should include 
'courses that provide a basic understanding of 
accounting, economics, psychology, and of his-
torical and contemporary social and political 
processes.' .. . The Task Force concurs with the 
recommendation and urges, with the Foulis 
Report, that prelaw students should receive clear 
and concise information expressing that pref-
erence. In the broadest sense, we take the Foulis 
Report to support undergraduate liberal educa-
tion as highly desirable preparation for law 
school (as does the 1953 AALS Statement), and 
the Task Force joins in that position. 
I have little sympathy for the student 
who takes "crip" courses unrelated to skills 
desirable at the law in order to build up a 
good GPR and enhance the possibility of 
getting a law school entrance application 
approved. Lawyers are in the word busi-
ness; they have nothing to offer their 
clients except written and spoken words . 
Skills in the field of communication should 
be developed at the undergraduate level. 
Law schools offer no courses in public 
speaking, but the faculty is unable to ex-
plain why. 
The University of South Carolina Law 
School, which supplies about ninety per 
cent of our applicants, lists more than one 
hundred courses in the catalog. Many of 
them are totally unrelated to the problems 
which the South Carolina lawyer will most 
likely be solving. It would be well, if one 
had the luxury of time, to study all of these 
courses, but inasmuch as time is limited, 
we reached the conclusion that students 
should be studying the subjects concerning 
those areas of the law into which they will 
most likely be thrown. Every law school 
has what they refer to as a core curriculum, 
required subjects, which are so important 
every student should study them . Our 
Rule 5 includes the subjects named in most 
core curriculums: contracts, property, con-
stitutional law, legal research, civil and 
criminal procedure. The Rule merely adds 
a few more which we think equally impor-
tant. Students should not be allowed to 
waste their time on Roman law, w ith which 
they will never be concerned, when in 
truth they will be concerned with such 
things as torts, taxation, insurance and 
domestic relations. 
Our Rule requires that each admittee to 
the Bar have eleven trial experiences in 
various courts as named above. This w ill 
not assure a good trial lawyer, but inescap-
ably, the admittee will know more about 
how to act than if he or she had never seen 
a case tried. Prior to the adoption of our 
Rule, it was not unusual to find young law-
yers admitted to practice who had never 
even seen a case tried before a judge or jury. 
Our student practice rule permits se-
lected students to participate, along with a 
lawyer, in the trial of cases. Similar rules 
have been promulgated in many other 
states . 
Our "Bridge the Gap" Program follows 
the pattern of several other states which 
now require that students take a course in 
office and courtroom procedures . Ours is 
more comprehensive than most. It is d i-
rected by Chief Justice ElectJ. B. Ness. It is 
a thirty-hour course, and the facul ty is com-
posed of some of the sta te's most outstand-
ing lawyers and judges. We undertake to 
teach the young lawyer how to act and 
what to do when the client comes to the 
office and how to act and what to do w h en 
he goes to court for the firs t t ime . T h e 
students were unhappy wi th this course 
when it began . On the las t day, students 
were delighted w ith what they had learned. 
At first the demands of Rule 5 were at-
tacked by the academic world, but the Rule 
has now come to be accepted and the bene-
fits appreciated. In order to improve the 
administ ration of justice, w e need to insure 
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the competency of the judges and the law-
yers. This can be done by improving the law 
student and his education. The law student 
can be improved by having him begin his 
training for a career at the law at the under-
graduate level. All of this we undertake. 
Legal education and lawyer competency 
will not be greatly improved until the 
House of Delegates of the American Bar 
Association come to grips with the accredi-
tation of law schools. Routinely, the House 
rubber stamps the recommendations of the 
Section on Legal Education and Admission 
to the Bar. The section is dominated by pro-
fessors and law school deans. Few members 
of the Bar have read the requirements for 
the accreditation of a law school. A detailed 
study of these recommendations will reveal 
that there is substantially nothing therein 
which requires good training for the stu-
dent. Much is included to assure favorable 
working conditions for the faculty. 
Mr. Allan Ashman has requested me to 
report on the workings of our Rule S which 
has now been in effect for five years . The 
answer, Mr. Ashman, is that it is working 
well. The bench and bar in South Carolina 
are happy with the program. The students 
are benefitting from it, and in turn, the 
lawyer and his client are assured of better 
representation. 
1. Law School and Professional Education Report and 
Recommendations of the Special Committee for a 
study of Legal Education of the American Bar 
Association . 
2. Report of Task Force on Professional Competency 
-American Bar Association. 
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Stephen P. Klein: On Testing 
This article is !he fourth in a series dealing with such 
topics as scaling MBE and essay scores, procedures for 
setting pass/ fail scores, and score reporting. Because ii is 
our intention to structure these articles so Iha/ they will be 
of optimum benefit to bar examiners and bar admission 
administrators, readers are in vited lo suggest additional 
topics for this series. The views expressed in Dr. Klein 's 
article are his own and do no/ necessarily represent !hose of 
NCBE. 
IV. Essay Grading: Fictions, Facts 
and Forecasts 
The first portion of this arti-
cle discusses four common myths about 
grading essay answers . These misconcep-
tions often lead to grading practices that do 
not conform to official board of bar exa-
miner policies or satisfy basic professional 
standards for score reliability and fairness 
to applicants. The four myths are: 
• It is best to have one and only one reader 
per question. 
• Extraneous characteristics of an answer, 
such as length and penmanship, do not 
affect grades if readers agree to ignore 
these factors. 
• All essay questions have the same influ-
ence on whether an applicant passes if all 
the questions have the same maximum 
score; i.e., the number of points assigned 
to a question determines how much 
weight it carries. 
• Two essay tests are equally difficult to 
pass if the score required for passing 
them is the same; i.e ., even though these 
tests had different questions and readers. 
The second portion of this article pro-
vides suggestions for avoiding the prob-
lems that are often created by these myths. 
Finally, it discusses how many states are 
now implementing these suggestions. 
Myth #1: Only One Reader Is Better 
The Bar Examiners ' Handbook recommends 
that "all of the answers to a particular 
question should be graded by the same 
reader. " (page 283) The assumption under-
lying this recommendation is that if the 
same reader grades all answers, then there 
is a greater likelihood that the same grad-
ing standards will be applied to these 
answers . 
Empirical evidence usually supports the 
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foregoing assumption, but not the recom-
mendation that is made from it. Controlled 
experimental studies show that when a bar 
exam reader regrades a set of answers 
within a few days of the first reading (but 
without knowledge of the grades assigned 
initially), the second grade assigned to an 
answer tends to be somewhat (and some-
times radically) different than the first 
grade. Nevertheless, the average discre-
pancy between the first and second reading 
by the same reader is slightly smaller than 
it is between two independent readers. For 
instance, in one study1 readers agreed with 
themselves 75 percent of the time as to 
whether or not an answer was passing . 
Readers agreed with each other only 67 
percent of the time. 
On the surface, these data support the 
recommendation to use only one reader 
per question. However, I suspect that bar 
examiners will be less likely to embrace this 
recommendation when they discover some 
of the potential sources of the greater 
between than within reader inconsisten-
cies. These sources range from preferences 
for certain handwriting and penmanship 
styles to fundamental differences in the 
criteria that should be applied in the grad-
ing process. 
For example, suppose that one, but not 
both, of the readers assigned to a question 
believes that it is appropriate to deduct 
points from an answer that discusses (per-
haps incorrectly) an issue that is irrelevant 
to the question. Unless a protocol is deve-
loped for handling answers that discuss 
such issues before the grading process beg-
ins, there is a greater likelihood that the 
readers will agree more with themselves 
than they will with each other in the grades 
they assign. 
Another important source of differences 
between readers is how much emphasis 
each reader places on the different parts of 
a question, their preferences for which 
precedents should be discussed, and the 
order in which issues are considered. If two 
qualified readers do not agree on a ques-
tion's scoring guide and the relative impor-
tance of different aspects of an answer, 
how can applicants be expected to know 
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how to compose their answers? 
The rationale that the same reader should 
be used for all answers in order to maxi-
mize reliabili ty is faulty because the source 
of the greater reliability may be factors 
that have nothing to do with answer qual-
ity. Instead, they may be idiosyncratic to 
the reader. A few jurisdictions compound 
the single reader problem by having the 
board member who drafted the question 
act as the sole grader of that question's 
answers . After all, it is thought, the person 
who wrote the question knows what he or 
she is trying to test with that question. The 
fact that no one else knows what is being 
tested, including some of the board mem-
ber's colleagues, does not seem to deter the 
handful of jurisdictions that still use this 
practice. 
Myth #2: Grades Are Not Affected by 
Extraneous Factors 
A second myth about grading bar exam 
essay answers is that readers base their 
grades solely on answer quality and that 
instructions to readers to ignore extrane-
ous factors eliminate the influence of these 
factors. The fact that this does not happen 
was demonstrated clearly in an experiment 
that John Garfinkle and I conducted with 
the participants at the NCBE's seminar for 
new bar examiners in April 1980. 
John Garfinkle developed two answers, 
A and B, to the same essay question. Both 
answers were of about equal quality. He 
then prepared two versions of each answer 
(A-1, A-2, B-1, and B-2). Versions A-1 and 
B-1 discussed the issues in the question in a 
clear and concise manner. Versions A-2 and 
B-2 contained the same content, but used 
about fifty percent more words to present 
it. In other words, the second version was 
merely longer than the first one. 
The bar examiners were assigned ran-
domly to two groups. One group graded 
answers A-1 and B-2 while a second group 
graded A-2 and B-1. Both groups were in-
structed to grade the answers in terms of 
their quality and to ignore such things as 
grammar, spelling, and length. On the aver-
age, the examiners in the first group graded 
answer B-2 higher than A-1. The examin-
ers in the second group graded answer A-2 
higher than B-1. Thus, in both groups, ver-
sion 2, the longer answer, received the 
higher grade. This occurred despite the 
fact that bar examiners were told to ignore 
answer length and almost all of them 
claimed that they preferred shorter an-
swers. 
The knowledge that longer answers tend 
to receive higher grades regardless of in-
structions to readers to ignore length pro-
bably comes as no surprise to experienced 
bar examiners. However, bar examiners 
may not be aware of the many other fac-
tors that inappropriately influence grades. 
For instance, applicant C's chances of pass-
ing the exam will be reduced if (1) applicant 
/\s and B's answers tend to be among the 
better answers to the questions and (2) 
applicant C's answers are always graded 
after /\s and B's answers. Similarly, hand-
writing quality has often been shown to 
affect essay grades.2 
Myth #3: Number of Points Assigned 
to a Question Determines Its Weight 
Another common myth about grading es-
say answers is that if the theoretical maxi-
mum score on two questions is the same, 
such as 100 points, then both questions 
carry the same weight in determining the 
relative standings of the applicants on the 
essay portion of the exam. 
The fallacy of this belief is demonstrated 
in the table below with hypothetical data 
for five examinees (A through E). 
Examinee Question I Question 2 Total 
A IO 100 llO 
B 20 99 ll9 
c 30 98 128 
D 40 97 137 
E so 96 146 
Average 30 98 128 
Note that the maximum scores on Ques-
tions 1 and 2 were 50 and 100, respectively, 
and that the rank ordering of examinees on 
Question 1 was directly opposite to the 
rank ordering on Question 2. Nevertheless, 
the final rank ordering was perfectly cons is-
tent with Question 1; i.e ., the question that 
had the lowest possible maximum score. 
Question 1 carried far more weight because 
the scores on this question spread out more 
from the average score on this question 
than did the scores on Question 2 spread 
out from their average score. In statistical 
terms, Question 1 had a much larger "stan-
dard deviation" than Question 2. 
Unless a jurisdiction takes specific steps 
to prevent questions from having markedly 
different standard deviations, it is not 
uncommon to find that one question will 
have a standard deviation which is twice 
that of another question . It therefore car-
ries twice the weight in determining total 
essay scores. It also refutes a state board's 
claim that all questions are of equal impor-
tance in determining who passes. An ex-
treme example of this situation is the ques-
tion on which all applicants receive the 
same grade. This question would have a 
standard deviation of 0 (zero) and it would 
have no impact on who passed or failed. 
Myth #4: Essay Grading Standards 
Can Be Maintained Across Exams 
A fourth myth is that a state is able to 
maintain the same essay grading standards 
across exams even though (1) the ques-
·tions on these exams change each time the 
test is administered and (2) there are often 
changes in who grades the answers. The 
belief that grading standards can be main-
tained across administrations is often re-
ferred to as the "seventy percent myth" or 
" I can recognize a passing answer w hen I 
see one." 
While many bar examiners believe they 
can recognize a passing answer when they 
see one, there is strong empirical evidence 
to the contrary. This evidence comes from 
several sources. For instance, two inde-
pendent readers often disagree on whether 
a given answer is passing and on the per-
centage of answers in a group that are pass-
ing. As noted above, readers are not sub-
stantially more consistent with themselves 
than they are with each other. Thus, not 
only can one reader's perception of a pass-
ing answer differ from another reader's 
assessment, but even over a few days, the 
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same reader will change his or her mind 
regarding the relative and absolute quality 
of an answer. 
Studies also show that it is possible to 
affect the score assigned to an answer by 
embedding it in a set of relatively high ver-
sus low quality answers.3 Statistical analy-
ses further reveal that when applicant abil-
ity is held constant (through the MBE), bar 
exam readers tend to be more lenient in 
grading answers written on February ex-
ams than in grading answers on July 
exams.4 
Two questions can have very different 
average scores even though in advance of 
the exam they were believed to be of equal 
difficulty. If this can happen (and we know 
it does), then it is apparent that two tests 
(made up of such questions) can also vary 
in difficulty even though a thorough but 
subjective appraisal of them suggested they 
were comparable. 
The problem here is that if a state's exam 
unintentionally varies in difficulty from 
one administration to the next, then that 
exam is not fair to applicants who happen 
to take an unusually hard version of it. We 
know this sometimes occurs and there is 
no way of determining in advance of giving 
a test how difficult its questions will be or 
how leniently the answers to them will be 
graded. Attempts to subjectively adjust for 
perceived differences in essay test diffi-
culty across administrations are notori-
ously unsuccessful. 
Recommendations 
The bleak picture painted here can be 
brightened considerably by adopting a few 
simple procedures : 
1. Assign at least two readers to each 
question. 
Some jurisdictions have every answer inde-
pendently graded by two readers. Other 
states, divide the answers up among the set 
of readers assigned to the question. 
Most states with multiple readers per 
question also employ some form of reread 
procedure. For example, one state has a 
second reading of all the essay answers of 
applicants who came close to either side of 
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the pass/ fail line on the total exam after the 
initial reading of their essay answers . If the 
score on the second reading differs sub-
stantially from the score on the first read-
ing, then the two readers meet and resolve 
what score should be assigned to the an-
swer. Otherwise, the average of the two 
scores is used because the average is usu-
ally the best estimate of answer quality. 
2. Have the readers assigned to a ques-
tion agree on a scoring guide for that 
question. 
A preliminary scoring guide for a question 
should be developed before the test is 
given. This helps to assure the question 
really measures what it is supposed to 
measure. For instance, do the persons who 
review the question agree with the guide? 
After the test is administered, the read-
ers assigned to the question should also 
review the guide for appropriateness. This 
activity includes reading several answers 
to determine whether the question elicited 
the responses that were anticipated. If not, 
the scoring guide should be revised in a 
way that indicates how to handle common 
responses. 
3. Calibrate the readers in the use of the 
scoring guide through the use of bench-
mark answers. 
The first step in this process involves each 
reader independently evaluating a set of 
two to four answers and deciding upon the 
relative quality of the answers in this set. 
All the readers assigned to a question eval-
uate the same common set of answers. 
This process is called "round robin" grad-
ing. For instance, if there are three readers 
assigned to a question, each reader would 
read one answer, pass this answer clock-
wise to the next reader, who would evalu-
ate it, and then pass it on to the third 
reader. In this way, all three readers can 
evaluate a common set of three or four 
answers. 
In the second step, the readers compare 
notes on their independent evaluations of 
the relative standings of the answers in the 
common set. This activity often leads to 
modifying the scoring guide in order to 
handle typical (albeit unanticipated) re-
sponses to the question. The calibration 
process involves one additional step in 
those jurisdictions that do not scale their 
essay scores to the MBE. This step consists 
of the readers deciding which answers 
should or should not be considered as 
"passing". 
An important feature of this process is 
that all the readers make their initial eval-
uations of answer quality independently. In 
other words, one reader does not know the 
grade assigned to an answer by another 
reader until they meet to discuss the 
answers. This approach helps to avoid one 
reader dominating another and simulates 
more closely the actual grading process. 
The process of independent "round 
robin" readings and achieving consensus 
on relative quality is repeated until there is 
an adequately high level of agreement 
among readers on the relative quality of 
the answers used for reader calibration. It 
usually requires four or five " round robin" 
grading sessions (with four or five answers 
per session) to achieve this degree of con-
sistency. 
After the readers achieve an adequately 
high agreement level, they identify the one 
or two answers at each score level that best 
illustrate the quality of the answers at that 
level. For instance, one state grades each 
answer on a five -point scale. As part of the 
calibration process, that state's readers 
identify five "benchmark" answers, one 
answer for each of the five points on the 
scale. These answers serve as guides in the 
grading of other answers . For example, a 
grader might read an answer and then ask 
a series of questions, such as: "Is this 
answer better, worse, or about the same 
qi:iality as the benchmark 3?'"'If it is better, 
is it as good as the benchmark 4?" 
Once the benchmarks are agreed upon, 
each reader assigned to a question reads a 
common set of about five answers to their 
question. This "round-robin" reading of 
answers is done independently. Any dis-
agreements in the grades assigned are dis-
cussed, the scoring guide modified as 
needed, and another set of five answers are 
subjected to " round robin" grading . This 
sequence of activities is repeated until all 
the readers for a given question indepen-
dently agree on the scores that should be 
assigned. They cannot agree to disagree. 
Taken together, recommendations one 
through three will help to eliminate the 
problem of essay scores being affected by 
the conscious and unconscious idiosyncratic 
preferences of a single reader. However, 
when multiple readers are used, they 
should be monitored to insure that their 
grading standards do not drift apart . 
4. Use a realistic score range. 
Many states still say they grade answers on 
a 100-point scale. However, an analysis of 
their data suggests otherwise. The grades 
tend to be assigned in 5-point intervals and 
almost all of them fall between SO and 90. 
Thus, only nine score levels are being used. 
Morever, only one especially low score on 
such a 100-point scale, such as a 30, may 
effectively preclude the examinee from 
passing the entire exam. 
The foregoing situation has led several 
states to give up the old 100-point scale and 
grade answers along a 5, 7, or IO-point 
continuum. This practice generally leads to 
more reliable scoring because readers are 
not asked to make distinctions where there 
are no real differences in answer quality. In 
general, the longer the question and the 
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more applicants answering it, the greater 
the need to have more points along the 
score continuum. 
5. Control for differences in standard de-
viations (score spread) among questions 
so that the questions carry equal (or 
prespecified) weight in determining total 
essay scores . 
This recommendation applies only to those 
jurisdictions that scale their essay scores to 
the MBE. In these jurisdictions, readers 
have merely to determine the quality of the 
answers relative to each other whereas in 
jurisdictions that do not scale, readers also 
have to decide which answers are passing . 
States that do not scale their essay scores 
to the MBE but statistically control for dif-
ferences in standard deviations among es-
say questions are likely to violate the prin-
ciples underlying grading on an absolute 
(as distinct from a relative) scale. 
The states that do scale their essay 
scores to the MBE can use indirect and/or 
direct controls on the standard deviations . 
Indirect control involves readers being 
instructed about the percentage of answers 
that should be placed in each of the possible 
score categories for a question (i.e ., grad-
ing on a predetermined curve) and requir-
ing that the same set of score categories be 
used on all questions . 
Direct controls are somewhat more com-
plicated . They involve converting the scores 
on each question to a prespecified mean 
and standard deviation. For example, sev-
eral states convert the scores on each ques-
tion to a distribution of scores that has a 
mean of SO and a standard deviation of 10. 
This conversion procedure does not change 
the examinees' relative standings, but it 
does result in the questions carrying equal 
weight . 
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Direct controls have several advantages. 
They insure that each question has the 
same weight. They also permit using one 
grading scale for one question and a differ-
ent grading scale for another question 
without affecting how much weight each 
question carries . For instance, the readers 
can use a 5-point scale for Question 1 and a 
10-point scale for Question 2. And, this 
will have no impact on the weight each 
question carries. 
The third advantage of direct controls is 
that they permit more weight to be as-
signed to some questions than to others 
(e.g ., those that are more complicated and 
for which applicants are given more time to 
answer) . Some jurisdictions use this tech-
nique of planned differential weighting in 
conjunction with the direct controls they 
place on standard deviations . 
Finally, by converting the scores on each 
question to a truly common scale (as dis-
tinct from one that just appears to be the 
same), it is easier to appropriately compare 
a given applicant's scores among questions. 
The only major disadvantage to direct con-
trols is that they are somewhat more diffi-
cult to explain. 
6. Scale the essay scores to MBE scale 
scores . 
Scaling the essay scores to the MBE scale 
scores puts both the MBE and the essay on 
the same scale of measurement . Moreover, 
because the MBE scale scores have been 
equated across the years, a given MBE 
scale score represents the same level of 
proficiency regardless of the exam on which 
it was earned. This same important charac-
teristic also applies to essay scale scores. 
Thus, setting the pass /fail line on the total 
exam in terms of a combination of MBE 
and essay scale scores eliminates the prob-
lem of some essay tests being more diffi-
cult than others because of the questions 
asked and/or the leniency with which the 
answers to them are graded. 
There are just as many myths about scal-
ing essay scores to the MBE as there are 
about essay grading. For instance, contrary 
to the popular misconceptions regarding 
this topic, scaling essay scores to the MBE 
does not give any more weight to the MBE 
than to the essay, it does not set the percent 
passing at a given level, and it does not 
change a given applicant's essay score in 
terms of that applicant's MBE score. 
Forecasts 
Most of the applicants who took the July 
1985 bar exam will be affected by one or 
more of the procedures described above. 
For instance, all of the following jurisdic-
tions scale their essay scores to the MBE 
























In the years to come, I expect more juris-
dictions will scale their essay scores to the 
MBE, employ multiple readers per ques-
tion, have automatic and independent re-
read procedures for applicants who were 
close to the pass/fail line after the first 
reading, and control for differences in 
standard deviations among questions . 
These technical changes will be adopted as 
bar examiners continue to question the 
myths surrounding essay grading and as 
they have to cope with the petitions filed 
by failing applicants who feel they were 
unfairly treated. 
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A National Law Practice 
Will Piper Lead the Way? 
by Allan Ashman 
After following a rather ser-
pentine route through federal trial and 
appellate courts, New Hampshire's resid-
ency requirement finally was struck down 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Supreme Court 
of New Hampshire v. Piper.I New Hampshire 
had required that applicants for admission 
to the bar become residents of the state 
before they actually could be sworn into 
the bar. 
Both durational and simple residency re-
quirements have been subject to intense 
scrutiny in recent years. Some states volun-
tarily abandoned their residency require-
ments while other federal and several state 
courts held existing rules unconstitutional. 
Still, before Piper, many states had some 
form of residency requirement either as a 
prerequisite for taking the bar examina-
tion, or for admission on motion, or, like 
New Hampshire, as a prerequisite for 
Allan Ashman is executive director of the National Con-
ference of Bar Examiners in Ch icago. The opinions are his 
own and do not necessarily represent those of the National 
Conference of Bar Examiners. 
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simply being sworn in. Now, the constitu-
tionality of all such requirements is suspect 
following the Piper decision. 
The Basic Question 
But what does Piper really portend? For 
example, is it simply the logical denoue-
ment of one unreasonable and impractical 
restriction facing bar applicants, or does it 
mark the beginning of the removal of all 
barriers to the interstate practice of law? 
What follows are some random observa-
tions and a bit of idle speculation on this 
provocative question. 
Are the Rules Too Restrictive? 
During the past decade, there have been 
increasing protestations from many quar-
ters that the current rules requiring the 
passing of a bar examination and admission 
to the bar in each state in which lawyers 
wish to practice regularly constitute in-
tolerable and impractical restrictions on 
the present-day practice of law, on the 
development of a needed national law prac-
tice, and on the legal needs of national, 
commercial, financial and industrial busi-
ness entities . The residency restriction, in 
particular, had become increasingly vexa-
tious with the growth of law firms that 
maintain branch offices in many states and 
with the increased use of in-house counsel 
by multistate corporations . 
In 1978, Chesterfield Smith, a past pres-
ident of the American Bar Association, 
stated that it would be in the "national 
interest and the interest of nationwide 
consumers of legal services that restrictive 
practices and state barriers be eliminated 
and interstate reciprocity broadened ... . "2 
Smith believed that the "chilling" of inter-
state bar admissions was in conflict with 
the long-range economic interests of the 
legal profession and the nation.3 He also 
thought that many of the states that had 
erected fences against out-of-state lawyers 
had done so primarily to protect their own 
lawyers from professional competition. 
No Fear of 'Carpetbagging' 
The court in Piper made it quite clear that 
this reason was "insubstantial" to justify 
such barriers, noting that the privileges 
and immunities clause of the Constitution 
was designed primarily to prevent such 
economic protectionism. 4 The court em-
phasized that the privileges and immuni-
ties clause was intended to create a na-
tional economic union. The court did not 
share the concern of Chief Judge Levin 
Campbell and Judge Stephen Breyer of the 
U.S . Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
who, in the First Circuit's en bane reconsid-
eration of the Piper decision, expressed the 
view that New Hampshire could reasonbly 
fear that complete abolition of residency 
requirements would mean large law firms 
in distant states would exert significant 
influence upon the decisions, practices, and 
makeup of the New Hampshire bar.s Law 
practice in certain fields, the judges stated, 
could come to be dominated by out-of-
state lawyers whose only connection with 
the state would be their desire to earn 
money there. 
But the court did not seem concerned, 
stating that barring nonresidents was an 
overbroad means of assuring that attor-
neys would be available for court or amen-
able to disciplinary proceedings . A review 
of nonresident attorneys appearing in New 
Hampshire courts, either as members of 
the bar or pro hac vice, indicated, according to 
the court, that residence was not substan-
tially related to in-court conduct or availa-
bility. The court also believed that New 
Hampshire's "simple residency" require-
ment was "underinclusive" as well, because 
it permitted lawyers who moved away 
from the state to retain membership in the 
bar. The court concluded that there was no 
reason to believe that a former resident 
would maintain a more active practice in 
the New Hampshire courts than would a 
nonresident lawyer who had never lived in 
the state. Nor did the court believe that a 
nonresident lawyer would conduct his prac-
tice in a dishonest manner. 
A nonresident lawyer's professional duty 
and interest in his reputation should, the 
court observed, provide the same incentive 
to maintain high ethical standards as they 
do for resident lawyers. A lawyer will be 
concerned with his reputation in any com-
munity where he practices, regardless of 
where he may live, the court stated. Furth-
ermore, a non-resident lawyer can be dis-
ciplined for unethical conduct. The court 
emphasized that the Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire has the authority to disci-
pline all members of the bar regardless of 
where.they reside . New Hampshire could, 
the court pointed out, discipline nonresi-
dent lawyers in the same manner in which 
it disciplines resident members. 
What the Court Didn't Hold 
Justice Wiliam Rehnquist, the lone dissen-
ter in Piper, suggested that the residency 
requirement promoted New Hampshire's 
"interest in maximizing the number of res-
ident lawyers, so as to increase the quality 
of the pool from which its lawmakers can 
be drawn." But this notion was rejected by 
the court's majority, which pointed out 
that only a few of New Hampshire's legis-
lators were lawyers and that, besides, non-
lawyers could serve on the state's courts. 
Having said this, the court emphasized 
that its holding in no way interfered with 
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the ability of the states to regulate their 
bars. Unlike pro hac vice applicants, nonresi-
dents who seek to join a state bar must 
have the same professional qualifications 
required of resident lawyers. 
Residency Rules in Question 
What then are we to make of this decision? 
Clearly one important barrier for out-of 
state lawyers to be admitted to the practice 
of law has, for all apparent purposes, been 
removed. While the precise effect of the 
decision is still unknown, it would seem 
logical to conclude that all residency rules 
for purposes of admission to the bar must 
now be called into serious question. But 
the Supreme Court in Piper has not gone so 
far as to declare that under existing eco-
nomic conditions the interstate practice of 
law is constitutionally mandated. It seems 
equally clear after Piper that each state still 
has a legitimate interest in regulating the 
admission and practice of lawyers to en-
sure that lawyers are professionally compe-
tent, are familiar with local laws and proce-
dures, and abide by the rule governing 
professional responsibility. But to effectu-
ate these purposes and to avoid needless 
litigation, I submit that in the wake of the 
Piper decision, states should begin a syste-
matic review of their admission standards 
with an eye toward retaining only those 
standards that are deemed to be reasonably 
related to the state's legitimate interests. 
Piper Leads the Way 
This, it is entirely plausible that Piper will 
serve as a catalyst for the removal of other 
barriers, reasonable or otherwise, that frus-
t rate or inhibit the interstate practice of 
law. In the past decade, we have witnessed 
a rather dramatic change in the practice of 
law characterized in large part by the soar-
ing numbers of multistate practitioners. 
This phenomenon probably can be attrib-
uted to a variety of factors including in-
creased lawyer specialization, the greater 
mobility of lawyers and clients, and in-
creased uniformity of state laws as a con-
sequence of more and more states adopting 
model and uniform laws and federal prac-
tice and procedures . 
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Consequently, Piper could spur a relaxa-
tion of pro hac vice admission and related 
requirements of association with local 
counsel for attorneys already admitted to 
practice . Pro hac vice status does not allow 
the nonresident to practice in a state on the 
same terms as a resident member of the 
bar. The lawyer appearing pro hac vice must 
be associated with a local lawyer who is 
present for trial or argument. Further-
more, a decision on whether to grant pro hac 
vice status to an out-of-state lawyer is 
purely discretionary. Also, states which 
currently require nonresident attorneys to 
maintain an in-state office may wish to 
rethink the purpose of this policy in light of 
the Piper decision. 
Piper could also have an indirect impact 
upon full admission to the bar in a sister 
state by motion upon proof of professional 
competence and personal integrity. On the 
one hand, states which currently permit 
reciprocity might seek to ease such admis-
sion by relaxing the prescribed years of 
practice from the customary five-out-of-
the-preceding-seven-years in the jurisdic-
tion of original admission to three-of-the-
past-five-years. Those states which do not 
permit admission on motion and require 
the seasoned practitioner to pass another 
full bar examination might explore the 
possibility of substituting a more limited 
attorneys' examination in local law and 
practice. This could be complemented by a 
rule requiring mandatory attendance of 
nonresident attorneys at periodic seminars 
on state practice, a step the court in Piper 
viewed as a less restrictive alternative to 
the existing residency requirement. 
Rethinking the Multistate 
To the degree that Piper does provide a spur 
toward more liberal rules and procedures 
with regard to the interstate practice of 
law, it might also prompt states to rethink 
some basic assumptions about the nature 
and uses of the Multistate Bar Examina-
tion. In recent years, there has been an 
increasing sentiment for " national accep-
tance of a multistate bar examination."6 
Such sentiment generally has embraced 
the twin concepts of greater uniformity 
and the transferability of MBE scores. For 
example, the Chief Justice of Nebraska, 
Norman Krivosha, thinks it "totally coun-
ter-productive to design a national exami-
nation to be given all over the country on 
the same day and then to redefine what 
'passing' the examination means from state 
to state. If the function of the MBE is to 
determine whether an applicant, given the 
right answer, still cannot recognize it, it 
seems to follow," the chief justice noted, 
" that the inability to recognize the right 
answer is the same throughout the coun-
try and should [be] treated the same 
everywhere."7 
Chief Justice Krivosha also has been a 
leading advocate of liberalizing existing 
rules with regard to the transfer of MBE 
scores from one state ot another. He finds 
little sense in the current practice which 
exists in several jurisdictions requiring an 
applicant to take another MBE examina-
tion even though the individual may have 
successfully completed the same exam just 
six months earlier.a 
Impact on Discipline 
Finally, Piper should prompt all jurisdictions 
to re-examine their own professional disci-
plinary standards and procedures. Until 
now, companies and law firms that regu-
larly have business in states with residency 
requirements have had to retain a local law 
firm to act as "local counsel." The imme-
diate impact of Piper should be to make it 
markedly easier for big law firms in major 
cities, and for corporations with large legal 
departments to handle lawsuits wherever 
they are filed . Therefore, it is far more 
likely that weak or ineffectual state moral 
character certification and lackadaisical en-
forcement of existing rules of professional 
responsibility could become the burden of 
sister states. Upholding the standards of 
professional responsibility must now be 
approached with less diffidence and indif-
ference . Rather, states should now become 
acutely sensitive to the fact that one state's 
disinterest in matters of moral character 
and fitness could become another state's 
embarrassment. 
In Conclusion 
Perhaps it is premature to characterize the 
Piper decision as a watershed in the evolu-
tion of bar admissions and the interestate 
practice of law. The more appropriate con-
sideration seems to be whether the states 
are going to allow the freedom of move-
ment that the decision implies or whether 
they are going to respond by imposing 
other restrictions. The next few months 
should provide a clue as to the direction in 
which we are headed. 
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